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Introduction
Agreement on the membership of a group of processes in a distributed system is a basic problem that arises in a wide range of applications.
Such groups occur when a set of processes co-operate to perform some task, share memory, monitor one another, subdivide a computation, and so forth.
These problems are seen in data base contexts [2] , real-time settings [7] , and distributed control applications [14] [3]. A process group's membership may change when its processes fail (they are removed), recover (re-instated), when new processes join, or when members voluntarily leave. Some form of consensus on group membership is necessary, for without it a server that respects its specification may nonetheless behave inconsistently with another server that has simply seen different group members. Cristian [8] , specified and solved a similar problem for synchronous settings. This paper explores the problem in an asynchronous environment.
In our model of computation, a set of processes communicate through a completely connected network of relia~ble, FIFO channels. Frocesses only fail by crashing, and once failed, do not recover. We model process recovery by treating 'recovered' processes as new and different process instances.
The system is fully asynchronous in that message delivery times are unbounded and there is no global clock.
Accurate detexXion of crashes (and rocovories) is impossible in an asynchronous environment. At best, a process can be suspected of having failed, but no process can ever be ktmvn to have crashed because real crashes are indistinguishable from communication delays. We therefore focus on what it means for a process to be a member of the group of operational processes in an asynchronous system. We model the presumed failure of a process by removing it from the group. The impossibility of detecting crashes also affects the meaning of correct process, for in the traditional literature a correct process is one that has not failed. In our setting, it is one that has not been perceived to have faikx.by a majority of processesl. Our goal is to make this mechanism mimic a fail-stop failure detector.
Our approach and solution differ from previous work on group membership for asynchronous systems. In contrast to Moser, et.al. [16] , we do not assume the existence of an underlying fault-tolerant atomic broadcast. Our solution is also cheaper than theirs, and the one proposed by Mishra, et.al. [15] . The protocol in Birman and Joseph [4] blocks during periods when failures and recoveries occur continuously. Our solution is fully 'online": we can process a constant flow of requests to both remove and add processes, In Section 2 of this paper, we discuss perceived failures in more detail and formally defirie the Group Membership Problem. We discuss why GMP is solvable despite its similarity to Distributed Consensus [10] . In Section 3 we discuss our solution from the perspective of maintaining each of the specification's terms. Section 4 analyzes the solution's message complexity. We also give an intuitive proof of its optimality. We conclude with a discussion and directions for future work. Our protocol is reproduced in the Appendix.
Perceived Failures
The notion of perceived failure is crucial to GMP in asynchronous environments. In this section we introduce our model and discuss perceived failures in detail. We also discuss how they affect GMP solutions and the meaning of correct process.
The System Model
Our system is of a set of n processes, Proc, communicating through complete set of reliable (Iossless and nongenerating), FIFO channels. There are no bounds on message transmission times, and no global clocks.
A process history, for a process p GProc, is a sequence of events including send events, receive events and specific internal events that arise in our algorithm. General internal computation is not modeled. We use semi(p, q,m) to denote the sending of message m by process p to process q, and recv(p, q,m) to denote q's reception of m from p. A history for p is denoted where the ej are events, and startP is a unique, internal event.
Denote by hP [i] the ith event of hP, and by IhP I the number of events of hP.
A system run is an n-tuple of process histories, one for each pi EProc.
We say an event, e, is in run r' =(hp*, hp2, ..., hPn ), if e is an event in some process history, and denote this bye c r.
Causality between events (denoted + and read happens before) in a given run is defined in the usual manner after Larnport [12] . In our model, a consistent cut, c, is a system run closed under +; that is, if e + e' and e' E c, then e E c. MembP(C) and Memb; to emphasize that the former is the composition of p's local view along cut c, while the lattler is the Xth instance of p's local view.
The reader should notice that we distinguish betwem the events fauUyP(q) and removep(q). This is bmause we will require processes to coordinate updates to their locat views.
A process's initiat, locat decision about another's faultiness must be propagated to all cohorts before removal can take place..
We extend local views to system views as follows.
Definition
Given a consistent cut c and a set of processes, S~Proc:
(0 S n Up(C)= 0
We say that S is the set of processes that determine the system view.
ReIating Sys~(c) to Failure Detection
As the definition of SySS(c) is crucial to our Group Membership Problem, it is worthwhile discussing some subtle points. Intuitively, SySs(c) models the set of processes that the members of S believe operational along consist cut c.
We are particularly interested in how the sets S and Sys~(C) relate.
Assume SySs(c) is defined and suppose q is not a member of the process group determining the system view; i.e.,q q~.
Then Membq (c) need not be identical to the system view.
Our concern lies with q taking an external action that reflects an incorrect composition of the system view. If q is truly failed this is impossible. So consider q c (~fi Up(c)). Two cases are of particular interest.
. q C (~rl Up(c) n SYSS(C)). In words, q is functioning, but is a member of neither the system view nor the group determining it. Given our intuition that Syss (c) is the set of processes mutually believing each other to be operational, communication should remain within this group. However, as q is operational along c, it may try to send messages to those in SySs (c). To effect our intuition, we would likearu]eof the form q @MembP(c) + &ultyP(q), which, via system property S 1, would prevent p from receiving messages from any q not in its local view. This prevents a process not in the system view from influencing those in it.
in the system state. Any extemat action by g would reflect an incorrect system view. To avoid this occurring we would like a rule requiring q to be in S whenever it is in Syss(C); (Syss(c) n Up(c)) G (S n Up(c)). It ii easy to see that (S n Up(C))~(Syss(c) n Up(c)).
Thus, we will require S = SysS(c). A few points are of note here. First, because our detection mechanism operates in finite time, a crash failure will be detected by any process dependent upon the failed one.
Problem
GMP-1 and property S 1 isolate faulty processes.
Second, notice that 'failure detections' by 'faulty' processes are finessed by these conditions. On the one hand, property GMP-5 forces processes, and therefore the system, to react to failure detections, also ruling out the trivial solution. On the other hand, S 1 causes messages from suspected faulty processes to be ignored (actttatly discarded), implying that if a process p makes a detection fuulryP(q) and some other process concurrently believes p to have failed, it may be that no operational process will learn of p's detection. If the detection were erroneous and q is operational, the event faultyP(q) may or may not trigger q's eventual exclusion.
The outcome will depend on the pattern of communication that ensues.
Finally, observe that, as an artifact of GMP-1, there is an implied composition of the various system views.
Specifically, given CZ, and q CSySZ-1, if not every prccess P e Sys"-1 believes faultYP(q)~ong Cz, then 9 must be in Sys". This approximates the intuitive notion that system views represent processes that are mutuatly believed operational.
Difference
Between GMP and Distributed
Consensus
Our safety and liveness properties both define GMP as well as distinguish it from Distributed Consensus (DC) [10] . l%cugh it appears very similar to GMP, DC is strictly stronger.
In DC, at least one process must reach a decision on a In this way, at the end of Phase I, all non-faulty processes (from rngr's perspective) believe faulty(q). In Phase II, mgr broadcasts a removat commit message, Commit(q), telling processes that (weak) consensus on q's failure has km reached and they can remove q from their locat views.
Processes mgr believes faulty will not participate in the update rdgorithms. Thus, the agreement on a new system view is contingent upon the subsequent removal of these processes. System propertyF2 ensures that operational outer processes become aware of such contingencies.
Observe that the invitation message, Remove(q), is unnecessary if mgr knows the outer processes atready believe q faulty. In this way, the contingent updates piggy-backed upon a commit message serve as an invitation for subsequent view changes. We can thus compress successive rounds if mgr makes known how it plans to change the system view next.
It is both interesting and important that reconfiguration requires a three-phase algorithm, though this is not surprising in light of Skeen's work on non-blocking commit protocols [22] . In the first phase (Figure 1 ), the initiator, r, broadcasts a reconfiguration interrogation message to all processes in its local view and awaits their responses6'7. If a majority respond, the initiator determines an update event, based on the outer processes' local states, whose execution would reestablish the system view. The initiator broadcasts this event as the reconfiguration proposal messages. After receiving a majority response, the initiator broadcasts a reconfiguration commit message. A majority response is essential in maintaining GMP-2 and GMP-3; without it, the initiator risks diverging from a set of operational processes (during a partition). Hence, an initiator not obtaining a majority response must block.
Issues Arising in Reconfiguration
If mgr fails in the middle of an update commit broadcast no system view will exist. To re-establish the system view, our reconfiguration algorithm must address two problems:
succession -which process should initiate the reconfiguration algorithm and which should assume the rngr role at the en~and progression -which system view should a reconfiguration initiator propose to resolve inconsistencies and maintain safety.
We solve the succession problem by assuming a deterministic, linear ranking on process identifiers, with mgr the highest-ranked process. Any process believing rttl those ranked higher than itself are faulty initiates the recon- Intuitively, reconfiguration depends on an initiator's ability to determine the last defined system view and propagate the correct proposal for the succeeding system view. In our algorithm, all successful recontigurers (those able to reach the commit phase), undertaking reconfiguration of the Xth system view, determine identical proposals.
GMP-2 requires system views to be unique. This forces any initiator to obtain responses from a majority of processes in its local view. An initiator can fail to obtain a majority in three ways : the initiator, itself, may be faulty, the network may be partitioned, or a majority of processes may be faulty.
Observe that the initiator believes a majority of processes faulty at the end of the phase in which it has broadcast.
Should this situation occur, recovery is still possible but requires a special algorithm (see [21] ) to resolve this issue.
To avoid this situation, processes should make their fault determinations cautiously.
GMP-3 forces us to account for invisible commits. These occur when a commit message is sent but the only processes to receive it fail. While no subsequent reconfiguration initiator will ever know whether any commit messages were sent, if an invisible commit did occur, the system must behave in a manner consistent with that event. This is the most difficult aspect of reconfiguration, as it is imperative that every invisibly committed update be detectable by every successful reconfigure. We can ensure this only if the degree of system-wide inconsistency is tightly-enough bounded so that any initiator obtaining a majority of responses in the interrogation phase can infer the composition of local views of processes not responding to it. That is, local views must not be permitted to diverge so far that majority subsets might not intersectl". 
Complexity Analysis
The sequence and timing of failures affect the message complexity of our algorithm. We consider the 'worst" and 'best' case complexity for our protocol to instatl a new system view. We also quantify the gain achievable when we can use the compressed update algorithm.
Let nz = lSysz 1, and rc be the number of tolerable 'l%is is at most 2nZ -3 messages.
When we cannot use the compressed algorithm we rcxptire 3nZ -5 messages. A single instance of the reconfiguration algorithm requires at most 5nr -9 messages.
Finally, if we can take advantage of the compressed algorithm, we save substantially in message complexity. For n -1 successive failure updates, none of which remove rngr, we require
=n2-2n -3<(n -1)2 messages, averaging fewer than n-1 messages per exclusion.
A standard two-phase algorithm would require an additional n --1 messages per exclusion, on the average.
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In each case, actual failures may reduce the number of response messages and thereafter the number in the broadcast.
Optitnality Results
Our GMP protocol combines two-phase (basic update) and three-phase (reconfiguration) commit protocols. Neither one-phase (i.e. a simple broadcast by a unique coordinator) nor two-phase protocols are sufficient for solving GMP. This is similar to the result in [22] in which it is shown that a three-phase commit algorithm is necessary in maintaining the consistency of a distributed database. We now give an intuitive proof of this for GMP.
Recall GMP-3 :
VP, q.(Memb; = Memb;) when Memb: and Memb; exist.
It is not difficult to show that a one-phase algorithm cannot achieve this. In the full paper, we formally prove that the solution satisfies our problem specification. Moreover, while we can
show that a three-phase protocol is necessary for reccmfiguration, we are currently investigating an optimization for our algorithm that would allow a process, in specific cir- We assume that the local eventsj2utltyP(q) and operaring~(q) have the relevant affects on these sets. We also assume that communication channels are opened and closed as required.
We distinguish two types of exits from the protocol. The first breaks execution in a particular task in the protocol, for 
